Rebirth of a nation

Dispatches from the free Ukraine

Calculation on a napkin

In the exact sciences, there is a concept of a calculation written “on a napkin”, or “on the back of an envelope”.  It refers to an approximate computation carried out in an informal setting, when some mathematicians argue over a coffee or a beer and want to get a rough estimate of some quantity.  In such computations, it is common to round off numbers, use general formulas, etc., with the understanding that the final answer might not be exact, but gives a ballpark estimate, accurate to within an order-of-magnitude.

In this post, we will perform such a calculation on a napkin, albeit of a very special kind.  We will estimate the economic cost, in today’s dollars, of the genocide committed by the Soviet Union against Ukraine in the 1930s.

Part I.  Holodomor

The central phase of the genocide is referred to in Ukraine as Holodomor, or death-by-starvation.  During the fall of 1932-1933, soviet forces confiscated all food stocks from Ukrainian peasants, sealed off the villages with military cordons, and, over the course of the winter, continued to remove any sources of food that remained.  This resulted in the near-complete destruction of the rural society in eastern Ukraine over the course of one winter.

Russia has aggressively denied the genocide.  In the west, the supreme resource for the history of this period is the recent work of Timothy Snyder.  An earlier book about Holodomor is that by Robert Conquest.  Last year, David Satter talked and wrote at length about Russia’s denial of its Soviet past.  (Satter was expelled from Russia this January.)  The U.S. Senate has recognized the artificial famine as a genocide, following the findings of the 1985 commission.

I first heard about “Holodomor” as a child from my grandfather, which however was too abstract to make much of.  A few years ago, my great-uncle relayed the experience of his mother; their family was one of the better-to-do ones of those in the country. Since she had money and urban outfits, she was allowed by the soldiers to the train station, so she could go to the city and buy food.  Upon return, they would inspect her bags to make sure she had only brought the number of kilograms necessary to feed her family, and no one else.

Holodomor was only one dimension of the greater campaign to extinguish Ukrainian national identity in the USSR.  Moscow also worked aggressively to eliminate the culturally successful elements of the Ukrainian society — systematically killing artists, scientists, musicians, writers, university professors, etc.  Whereas Holodomor destroyed Ukrainian civilization in the east, mass deportations have hollowed it out in the west.  My grandmother recounted how one of the most shocking images from her early childhood was seeing trains of people, with mothers holding babies in their arms, being deported to Siberia.  The train cars were completely open — the women and their suckling were just standing in the freezing winds of the Ukrainian winter, with thousands of kilometers laying before the much harsher winters they were being carried to.  And this was nearly a decade before the Nazi occupation of Ukraine in the 1940s, which my grandmother also saw firsthand.

These experiences are not in any way unique: most families in Ukraine, with the exception of Russians who were moved by the state into eastern Ukraine in massive numbers after the Holodomor, had one or more members killed by Stalin’s terror machine.

Part II.  The Calculation

How could one estimate the impact of these losses on the Ukrainian economy today?

To begin with, we fix the number of killed or deported at one-quarter of the Ukrainian population.  This figure is taken from the Senate resolution.  The number killed in Holodomor alone is probably less than that, but if we include repressions against cultural figures and mass deportations to the labor camps, it is a reasonable estimate.

Extrapolating to the present day, this implies that Ukraine is short 33% of its current population, which is just over 45 million. That is, there’s a deficit of 15 million in the current Ukrainian population, relative to the pre-Holodomor baseline.

For the measure of the economic contribution of one person, a natural choice is GDP per capita.  The Ukraine GDP per capita is currently 7,500 USD.  Multiplied by 15 million, this gives $122.5 billion/year.

However, this only counts the dimension of the genocide that is concerned with raw population loss.  Since the genocide specifically targeted the most valuable elements of the society, and resulted in the destruction of whole villages, oblasts, and the eastern countryside, the bulk of the economic loss is likely to be due to the second- and higher-order effects.  For example, the knowledge of arts and sciences that was cultivated over generations could not be passed from one talent to the next, because the university faculty has been executed.  The next generation could not then produce new works that would be competitive abroad and advance development at home.  In return, the people as a whole would have fewer resources to start families, and so on.

It is thus more appropriate to scale the economic value of every life to a hypothetical baseline in which the genocide had never occurred in the first place.  For this, one possibility is to take the per capita average of the EU countries, which is about $30,000.  Multiplying by 15 million, we get $450 billion / year.

The choice of the EU average is motivated by the fact that, on the one hand, it excludes the really “rich” countries which could be said to have unique historical fortunes or advantages (United States: $54.6K, Canada: $43.14K, Norway: $55.4K, Switzerland: $46.0K), and, on the other hand, it includes some of the rapidly developing countries in eastern Europe in which the effects of the Soviet empire on their economy are still visible.  In essence, the average represents the completely free countries that were able to develop without foreign interference for a couple of generations.  This would be Ukraine without the Soviet empire.

One could also consider adding to the “$112.5 bln” number the amount required to raise the per capita GDP of the entire Ukrainian population, now considered to be at 60 million, to the European level.  This would apply the increment to the initial 45 million as well, yielding $1462.5 bln / year.  In essence, this number represents the cost of completely removing the effects of Soviet imperialism on Ukraine today.

There is indeed a grey line between ultra-aggressive imperialism and genocide.  When a national language is forbidden to be used in schools, in the press, at public events, etc. then the use of language will decline and fewer people will feel connected with the national identity that it carries.  The question for us is where to draw this line.

I think it a natural choice to draw it precisely at the point where people were killed. Thus we take the $450 billion figure.

If this quantity is to be obtained from annual interest on a principal, we can calculate the principal once we decide on the interest rate.

Ideally, the interest rate should coincide with the growth rate of the economy.  The growth rate is higher among the developing countries, and varies widely from one place to the next.  If Ukraine were to receive an additional ($30,000 * 15 million) contribution to its economy, it would add $10,000 per person, placing the GDP rate at $17,500.  This development mark was passed by Poland during the past decade.

Poland shares many parallels to Ukraine: it is roughly similar in population and territory, the countries share a common history and have many cultural ties, they were the central territories of the Bloodlands, where Hitler and Stalin have slaughtered millions of civilians with policies that often enabled one another, — and they are both struggling to shake off the lingering effects of the Soviet occupation.  If the new government in Kyiv succeeds in establishing a truly liberal democratic system, Ukraine would likely follow Poland’s example in its integration with Europe.

The rate of growth of the Polish economy averaged 4% during the past decade.  $440 billion is four percent of $11 trillion.  This is the capital that one must invested today, in order to receive $450 billion each year from the 4% interest.

By a curious coincidence, the average growth of the world economy since WW2 has also averaged around 3.5-4%.  Thus, the principal that would have generated 11 trillion today would represent the same share of the gross wealth of the world back then.

Part III.  Conclusion

To a pragmatic Russian government, the international recognition of a debt of such scale could appear to be a real threat.  At a 2008 security summit, in response to a question by an Estonian journalist, who asked why Russia would not say “we are sorry for imperialism”, Putin gave a long-winded reply, at one point exclaiming: “Why should we let the dead pull us by the sleeves?”  The gambit to deny the memory of the genocide having taken place would invite the reintroduction of the Soviet identity into the Russian statecraft, which philosophy stresses the possibility to construct reality with propaganda — and (elsewhere) with force.

If the leadership of Russia perceives the potential of ex-soviet states to demand repayments for the soviet atrocities as a serious threat, then the quickest way to remove that perception would be to initiate proceedings at the International Criminal Court, to settle once and for all the lingering legacy of World War 2 and carry out a Nuremberg trials for the Soviet Union.

Of course, the potential Russian war with Ukraine, leading to a great loss of life, would not be stopped by asking Russia to pay 11 trillion.  Rather, an important motivation to execute this war would be removed — and the great loss of life be made less likely — if the world pronounced, in one voice, that it remembers Stalin’s crimes against humanity.

 

BALLS

WOW.  It actually happened.

Obama’s executive order is really, really good.  It actually goes all the way and does the right thing.  Which, coming from Obama, is kinda nuts.

Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person (including any foreign branch) of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

(i) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, any of the following:

(A) actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine;

(B) actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; or

(C) misappropriation of state assets of Ukraine or of an economically significant entity in Ukraine;

(ii) to have asserted governmental authority over any part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine;

(iii) to be a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in any activity described in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section or of an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order;

This will hurt.  For the first time in history, a Western power has spoken to Putin using a language that is intelligible to him.

It is also quite significant that the executive order begins with:

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the actions and policies of persons — including persons who have asserted governmental authority in the Crimean region without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine — that undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

This is extremely strong language.  It basically says, “Whoever you are, if you had anything to do with the shit in Ukraine, we gonna find you and take all your money, we gonna take everything, you can’t hide, we’ll find you and take everything, tapeworm..”

I think this is exactly the kind of American creativity that constitutes a good use of the opportunity that the Crimea crisis has presented.

It’s also really cool to see this president get very very very angry, for the first time, ever.  This executive order just might earn him that Nobel prize!

 

Ukraine, America, and nukes

Update: Actually, the Budapest Memorandum does not mention direct military assistance in the time of attack.  It does however stipulate that

  • The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
  • The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
  • The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Here is how I see American sensibilities and responsibilities.

In 1994, Russia, UK, and America signed a deal with Ukraine, where, in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal — the 3rd largest in the world — Ukraine was given express security guarantees on the inviolability of its borders. Last week, Russia blatantly violated Ukrainian territorial integrity and is currently in the process of annexing Crimea.  In principle, international law requires U.S. to now send its troops to Ukraine and throw out the Russian forces.

Of course, that is not going to happen, because no reasonable person wants to have a war with Russia.

Since the actual security guarantees declared in the “Budapest Memorandum” have proved not to be meaningful, the deal should instead be interpreted as giving America the freedom to act however it chooses to.  Some presidents might have seen opportunities in military action; the current president might see opportunities in other types of action.

In this crisis, the “vital interest” for America is nuclear non-proliferation. If Russian intervention cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of Ukraine, no other country will ever believe that international community’s goodwill can be a substitute for having the bomb.  Because — how can you trust the promises of others, if even America’s security guarantees turn out to be worthless?

The vision of a nuclear-free world, at peace, is sometimes declared to be one of America’s fundamental national goals.  How important it really is to America’s foreign strategy can certainly be debated.  I tend to think that, in the defense establishment, many take it pretty seriously.  If so, the U.S. might explore the above opportunities to diminish Russian power.

Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia: new polling data

Great timing!  The results of joint research by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and Moscow-based Levada-Center were released today.  1603 persons were polled between 8-18th February, just before the revolution reached its climax.

None of the sources provide an English-language report, but google translate does a pretty decent job:

What would you like to see between Ukraine and Russia? (by region) 

West Center South East General
They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs 24.0 20.9 10.5 2.0 14.7
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs 66.7 69.7 63.8 72.2 68.0
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state 0.7 5.4 19.4 25.8 12.5
AC / HB 8.6 3.9 6.3 0.0 4.7

 

What would you like to see between Ukraine and Russia? (by nationality)

Ukrainian Russian General
They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs 17.4 4.6 14.7
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs 68.4 62.9 68.0
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state 8.7 31.8 12.5
AC / HB 5.5 0.7 4.7

What would you like to see between Ukraine and Russia? (by age)

18-29 30-54 55+ General
They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs 20.1 15.6 11.7 14.7
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs 66.9 68.3 67.3 68.0
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state 5.4 11.2 17.2 12.5
AC / HB 7.6 4.9 3.8 4.7

 

What would you like to see between Ukraine and Russia? (Depending on the orientation of the accession to the EU or the Customs Union)

EU Customs Union Do not know General
They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs 29.2 2.8 11.2 14.7
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs 63.0 69.5 71.2 68.0
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state 1.1 26.5 6.4 12.5
AC / HB 5.8 1.1 11.1 4.7

 

What would you like to see between Ukraine and Russia? (Depending on support for Maidan)

Support Do not support Hard to say General
They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs 26.0 6.6 7.6 14.7
Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs 66.9 69.2 62.1 68.0
Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state 2.3 21.4 8.6 12.5
AC / HB 4.7 3.1 22.7 4.7

 

These numbers show that one should be careful in assessing the social divisions in Ukraine.  At least when it comes to relationship with Russia, there is a solid two-thirds majority who have a clear idea of what they want: an independent Ukraine with friendly ties to Russia.  This proportion is remarkably stable across different variables.

The report also looked at support for integration with Russia in each eastern region individually:

The percentage of those who would like to see Ukraine join Russia 

  Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state in 2013,% Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state 8-18 February 2014,%
Crimea 35.9 41.0
Donetsk 29.8 33.2
Lugansk 29.4 24.1
Odessa 22.8 24.0
Dnipropetrovsk 14.7 13.8
Kharkiv 13.9 15.1
Zaporozhye 8.9 16.7
Vinnitsa 8.6 2.7
Kyiv (city) 3.7 5.3
Poltava 3.3 4.3
Kiev (oblast) 3.0 6.4
Lviv 0.3 0.0

Curiously, in Russia itself, the support for two countries being completely independent, without any special ties, is higher than in Ukraine.

What would you like to see in Ukraine’s relations with Russia?

UKRAINE
Date They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state Difficult to say Together
kvit.2008 10 67 20 3 100
ver.2008 17 66 16 2 100
lyut.2009 8 68 23 1 100
trav.2009 10 65 23 2 100
zhovt.2009 11 67 19 3 100
ber.2010 11 67 19 3 100
cherv.2010 12 70 16 2 100
zhovt.2010 10 67 20 2 100
lyst.2011 13 67 16 1 100
feb. 2012 13 69 16 2 100
ver. 2012 11 72 14 3 100
lyut.2013 13 68 16 3 100
trav.2013 11 69 14 5 100
lyst.2013 12 73 9 6 100
lyut.2014 15 68 12 5 100
RUSSIA
They should be the same as with other countries – with closed borders, visas and customs Russia and Ukraine should be independent but friendly states – with open borders without visas and customs Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state Difficult to say Together
ber.2008 19 56 19 6 100
ver.2008 24 52 13 11 100
sich.2009 29 51 12 8 100
cher.2009 25 55 14 6 100
ver.2009 25 55 13 7 100
sich.2010 25 55 14 6 100
trav.2010 17 64 13 6 100
ver.2010 16 60 18 6 100
ver.2011 16 63 14 6 100
sich.2012 16 61 16 8 100
ver.2012 14 60 20 6 100
lyut.2013 13 64 18 6 100
trav.2013 19 58 15 8 100
ver.2013 23 55 16 6 100
sich.2014 19 59 16 6 100

 

It will be interesting to see how these numbers evolve as the military intervention continues.

War Begins

On Saturday, the russian government officially announced sending troops to Ukraine.  This comes two days after Russian helicopters and armor crossed into Crimea, taking de facto control of the peninsula.  This in itself already constituted an act of war; we can expect a couple more days of such provocations and Ukrainian government’s attempts to ignore them, but sooner or later firefights will break out in eastern Ukraine.

In Kharkiv, my homecity, a pro-Russian rally stormed the regional council building, flying the russian tri-color over it.  Serhiy Zhadan, a prominent writer and an activist of the Maidan movement in Kharkiv, was beat up by the crowd.  A lot of busses with Russian license plates were spotted at Kharkiv, some attackers had their handwatches set to Russian time, and the person who installed the flag was a citizen of Russia.  The next day, thousands of Kharkiv residents took to the streets to protest Russian military intervention — this time, both pro- and anti-Maidan factions were on the same side.

I arrived from Kharkiv to Kyiv yesterday.  The Ukraine capital is still mourning the heroes that gave their lives in the Ukrainian Revolution.  People are concerned about how to found systemic public oversight over the new government, and insure that these lives were not given in vain.  At the same time, they are very worried about developments in the east.

Why does Russia want a war with Ukraine?

Having been born and raised in Kharkiv with Russian as my native language, before moving to the U.S. and then Europe, I hope to give an account that can be understandable to my western friends.  This post will be the first to that end.

(Truth is, I had long predicted this war.  I do not view it as the worst outcome.  I would totally support eastern regions having an independence vote, under auspices of a free and all-inclusive national dialogue, free press, and fair democratic process.  But Moscow can’t.)

There are two reasons.  First is practical: because it’s in Putin’s economic and political interest.  The second is existential: Russia can’t afford to have a successful independent Ukraine, because then it would be called on to admit to Soviet crimes, which would be extremely damaging to Russian national historical narrative and identity.

Let’s look at the first one.  Russia is facing a long-term economic and national decline.  Putin’s kleptocratic regime simply cannot deliver a competitive economy in the global world.  Meaningful reforms are impossible because any moves toward liberalization put the regime under threat.  A country with the greatest amount of natural resources of any other, is delivering war-time demographics while failing miserably to move an inch toward modernization.

An intentional, well thought through war would help Kremlin by giving employment to what is undoubtedly the nation’s greatest asset: military might.  (In a way, the cold-war policy of containment succeeded precisely because it actively denied USSR effective use of this asset.)  Just as in the case of 1930s Germany, a well-controlled war would positively stimulate the economy.  True, this stimulus would come at the cost of international trade ties and good relations with the rest of the world.  But the only trade the Kremlin depends on today is oil and gas exports, which are unlikely to be boycotted globally, and a more hostile international environment would actually be in Putin’s favor, by opening up more opportunities for use of military.

Finally, a war at the Russia’s borders in such a sensitive country as Ukraine would go a long way to stabilizing Putin’s own regime at home.  The kremlin propaganda machine ensures that the public at large sees things exactly how the state wants them to see it.  In this connection, it is truly amazing to see the kremlin media in recent days detach itself so completely from the rest of the world, building a kind of parallel universe inside the regime’s information space.  The Ukraine’s president resurfacing in Russia to give a press-conference in which the only non-Russian journalist’s question was overdubbed by a mechanical rubbing noise is a particularly cinematic exposure of how this “matrix” operates.  Human rights violations, journalist killings, civil activists prosecutions, punk rock group detentions, torturings of lawyers and other non-political professionals, all of this would be justified by the reality of war.  It even shows Putin’s “prescient” leadership, to build the country up so as to be prepared for this war.

The second point is more delicate, and I will treat it in a separate post.  It is actually the more decisive factor forcing Russia’s invasion in Ukraine.

Let me conclude this post by warning against what I find to be the single most powerful and consistent hindrance to the West’s understanding of Russia.

I call it “the temptation to judge”.

The Western mind is not able to even seriously consider that Russia might be willing to start a new world war, were it in its national interest to do so, because that would be crazy and “bad”.

But who are you to judge?

The West is made up of developed countries which have good prospects for the future in a stable, peaceful, globalized world.  Most people in the west experience life in constant confidence that, no matter what happens, they are going to be more or less ok.  They have no moral authority to judge Russia.  The presumption of such an authority is even a form of modern day racism, echoing the principle that richer-is-better.

The Russian leadership doesn’t have good prospects in such a world.  They have little interest in hearing western advice about reforms which threaten the very sources of their lifestyle.  If they see an opportunity for Russia to become great again by blackmailing the world with nuclear war, and sense a decent chance of it being successful, they are certain to execute that option, and thereby expose the West’s own moral flaws.  The willingness to follow through on the threat would be seen in the Soviet political tradition as heroism, as the expression of the power of Will over History, a common theme in both Communist and Nazi ideologies.

Whenever an organism’s existence is threatened, it is in the nature of living things for it to do all it can to survive.  It’s not wrong.  It’s not crazy.  It’s life.

Existential struggles reveal the ugly forms in nature.  When humans are involved, one is tempted to moralize, in order to more fully distance one own self from them.  But this is a mistake.  One should also see the beauty in the lengths to which the human spirit can go in order to have their patch of freedom under the sun.  A true humanist loves Russia, for what it might do.

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